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Making Peace in Bosnia Work
Elizabeth M. Cousens*
This symposium asks "what makes peace agreements work" and
specifically directs us to explore the degree to which and how "quasi-
sovereigns" determine the answer. At a minimum, a peace agreement could
be said to "work" when formerly warring parties honor their commitments
more than they renege, and when a broader constituency develops within
post-war society to support that agreement's basic provisions. Along both
dimensions, the peace agreement providing the framework for politics in
Bosnia today works haltingly at best.' The explanation for its inadequacies
has very little to do with quasi-sovereignty, however. Rather, it has a great
deal to do with the decisions and actions of the all-too-sovereign national
governments and major international agencies that enjoy a
disproportionate influence over the implementation of the peace
agreement's key provisions.
My argument is straightforward. First, the Dayton Agreement that
ended Bosnia's war is no more and no less than its formal title suggests, a
General Framework Agreement for Peace, with the emphasis on "general"
rather than "framework." As soon as the parties and major implementing
agencies set up shop on the ground to begin turning the Agreement into
reality, they faced an immediate and constant need to make sensitive
judgments about events, set priorities among the Agreement's provisions,
and develop strategies to make their own work maximally effective. On
none of these judgments does the Agreement itself provide any guidance.
Second, and by implication, whether the Dayton accord "worked" would be
determined by judgments and decisions made during its implementation,
with international third parties playing a disproportionate role. Third, the
confluence of factors that brought the Bosnian parties to Dayton and
enabled them to emerge with a comprehensive peace agreement-even if
one laced with unwieldy compromises-desperately needed to be
sustained during implementation, both to ensure that agreed-upon
provisions were fully implemented and to move toward the final settlement
of those issues left unresolved. Instead, the diplomatic and military
* Elizabeth Cousens is an Associate at the International Peace Academy (IPA),
where she conducts primary research on Bosnia and Herzegovina and manages the
project Peacebuilding: Legacies and Strategies, an ongoing study of international efforts
to build long-term peace after internal conflicts in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti
and Somalia. Before coming to IPA, she spent several years as a Fellow at the Center for
International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University and received her D.Phil.
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1. Although other agreements and texts bear on the peace process in Bosnia, this
Article focuses on the Dayton Agreement, the General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, Bosn.-Herz., 35 l.L.M. 75 [hereinafter Dayton
Agreement].
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. formula that produced the Dayton Agreement was abandoned during the
first eighteen months of implementation. Now at the end of 1997, Bosnia
faces continuing obstacles to peace that arguably derive from mistakes
made and opportunities missed which international implementers could
have both predicted and avoided. Finally, however, the current task for the
international community is not to pull out with minimal gracelessness, as
several prominent American observers have recently suggested, but to
learn from the record of the past two years and apply international
resources more effectively to the consolidation of peace in Bosnia.2
I. Background
Bosnia's war was the third and most destructive stage of the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. 3 It followed an extremely short "war" over Slovenia, which
declared independence from the Yugoslav federal state in June of 1991 but
met only half-hearted opposition from the Yugoslav National Army (JNA).
It also followed war in Croatia, whose simultaneous declaration of inde-
pendence met far more serious resistance from the JNA, Serb paramilitary
units, and its own autonomy-seeking Serb population.4 As the war in Croa-
tia continued through late 1991, mobilization for conflict in Bosnia had
already begun. Serb leaders had very vocally declared their intention to
remain within the Yugoslav Federation or seek separation from Bosnia.
Serb "autonomous areas" were established in the fall, and a plebiscite was
held in Serb areas to demonstrate Serbian opposition to Bosnia's secession
2. Several practitioners and academics have recently called for the U.S. to cut its
losses in Bosnia. See U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Editorial, The Bosnia Puzzle
Needs a New Solution, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 11, 1997, at A31; Henry Kissinger, Editorial,
Limits to What the U.S. Can Do in Bosnia, WAsH. PosT, Sept. 22, 1997, at A19; John J.
Mearsheimer, Editorial, The Only Exit from Bosnia, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1997, at A2;
Michael O'Hanlon, Editorial, What to Do in Bosnia?, WASH. PosT, Oct. 13, 1997, at A26.
For the counter argument, see Richard Holbrooke, Editorial, In Bosnia, Patience, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 28, 1997, at C7.
3. The Yugoslav state comprised six republics (Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Solvenia, Montenegro and Macedonia); two semi-autonomous provinces linked to Serbia
(Kosovo and Vojvodina); and six constituent nationalities (Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian,
Montenegrin, Macedonian and Muslim, the last having become an official Yugoslav
nationality by constitutional amendments in 1974).
Long before it would have seemed plausible that Yugoslavia would literally dissolve,
the political center of gravity had shifted significantly from the country's federation
institution to its republics and provinces. Yugoslavia's third constitution, adopted in
1974, devolved authority along virtually every axis of institutional power: each republic
acquired its own central bank, its own communist party, its own educational system, its
own judiciary, and, very importantly, its own police. The only institution which still
operated exclusively at the federal level was Yugoslavia's national army, though it now
acquired as Commander-in-Chief, an eight-member, rotating federal Presidency. By the
late 1980s, the complex balance of powers between Yugoslavia's federal institutions and
its republics and provinces had become unstable and increasingly unsuited to contain-
ing the rival agendas of political leaders emerging at the republican level.
4. Serb radicals in the Krajina region of Croatia declared their own "independence"
as early as August 1990, which they effectively retained until mid-1995 when the Croa-
tian Army, then better armed and trained, retook the region, expelling virtually all of its
Serb population.
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from Yugoslavia. By early January 1992, Serbian president Slobodan
Milosevic had also begun transferring Bosnian Serbs in the JNA back to
Bosnia in anticipation of hostilities. Meanwhile, Bosnia's president, Alija
Izetbegovic, and the Muslim-led Party of Democratic Action (SDA), grew
increasingly committed to Bosnian independence. The successful seces-
sion of Slovenia and Croatia, recognized by the international community in
January 1992, left Bosnia with a Hobson's choice: remain in a much
smaller Yugoslavia which would be overwhelmingly dominated by Serbia
and, by implication, by its own large Serb minority; or leave the Yugoslav
federation, a prospect that Bosnian Serbs worried would leave them analo-
gously dominated by Bosnia's Muslim plurality.5 In the event, Bosnia was
recognized as an independent state by the European Community on April
6, 1992,6 one month after barricades were first raised in Sarajevo city
streets, two'days after President Izetbegovic ordered a general mobilization
of Bosnia's territorial defense forces, and one day after Serb paramilitary
forces besieged Sarajevo's police academy and theJNA seized its airport. In
short, recognition occurred just as the country was being plunged into war.
During the next three and a half years, Bosnian government forces
fought to preserve an independent, unitary state that would enjoy the same
borders as the former Bosnian republic and, ostensibly, offer the same
rights to its Serb and Croat citizens that they had enjoyed when Bosnia was
a constituent republic of Yugoslavia.7 The government found itself at war
on at least two fronts. From the beginning, and principally, it battled radi-
cal Bosnian Serbs, closely tied to and actively supplied by Serbia, who
fought to "cleanse" large portions of Bosnian territory of non-Serbs and
declare an independent Serbian Republic (Republika Srpska) which might
eventually join Serbia proper. Secondly, it faced Bosnian Croats, closely
tied to and actively supplied by their own patron Croatia, who launched
their own ethnically driven land grab in central and southern Bosnia in
April 1993.8 The conflict between the Bosnian government and Bosnian
5. According to the last pre-war census in 1991, Bosnia's population was 44% Mus-
lim, 31% Serb, 17% Croat, and 8% Yugoslav and Other. See SusAN WoomVARD, BALKAN
TRAGEDY: CHAos AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 33 (1995). Increasingly, "Bos-
niac" has been used to refer to non-Serb and non-Croat Bosnians, basically replacing the
designation "Muslim" with a term marginally less exclusivist.
6. See Alan Riding, Europe Nods to Bosnia, Not Macedonia, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 7, 1992,
at A3.
7. Fear that these rights might disappear was not unfounded, though it was also
extravagantly stoked and manipulated by Serbian and Croatian leaders. Yugoslavia
operated as a complex and delicate balance of powers among its republics and constitu-
ent nationalities. Such arrangements were called into question, at least constitutionally,
when a Republic became an independent state. Croat, Serb, and Muslim status as con-
stituent nations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (along with Slovene, Montenegrin,
and Macedonian) did not guarantee them equal status as constituent nations of Bosnia.
It did not ease concern when Izetbegovic announced that the SDA opposed national
power-sharing in Bosnia in favor of one-man-one-vote, a change which favored the larger
Muslim population. See LAURA SiBER & AL.AN LITLE, YUGosLAA: DEATH OF A NATION
209 (1995).
8. Hard-line Croats in Herzegovina declared their own independent Croatian
Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, whose full dismantling has yet to occur.
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Croats was resolved, at least tactically, in 1994 after intensive diplomatic
efforts by the United States. Finally, on November 20, 1995, a comprehen-
sive settlement was reached among all three warring parties after twenty-
one days of proximity talks in Dayton, Ohio. By the time the Dayton Agree-
ment was initialed, over half of Bosnia's pre-war population of 4.4 million
had fled their original homes, either to live as refugees outside the country
or as internally displaced persons elsewhere in Bosnia; the dead or missing
were estimated at 279,000, or close to 7% of the pre-war population; 9
nearly half of the country's housing stock was damaged or destroyed; and
most of its economic infrastructure was devastated.10
II. Settlement at Dayton
Prior to the Dayton Agreement, different international mediating bodies
had developed a series of peace plans, none of which had been sufficiently
acceptable to the parties, nor sufficiently backed by major international
actors, to become the basis for a comprehensive settlement. Several factors
are widely acknowledged to have made the Dayton Agreement possible,
where settlement had earlier been elusive.
First, the international community discovered operational coherence
sometime in 1995. Since the war began, international mediation, military
and humanitarian efforts had worked at cross-purposes; that year, however,
they began to function more productively to support a common strategy to
end the war. In large part, this coherence was forced upon the interna-
tional community by the Bosnian Serb Army. Previous calls for more mus-
cular diplomacy in the Balkans had been persistently undermined by the
vulnerability of U.N. peacekeepers and other international personnel on
the ground-primarily those deployed in six U.N.-designated Safe Areas-
should the use of force by NATO invite reprisals." The necessity of resolv-
ing this dilemma became shamefully evident when Serb forces took hun-
dreds of U.N. peacekeepers hostage following NATO air strikes in May
9. See Dr. Kemal Hrelja, Review of the Economic and Social Situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 1986-1996, in WORKSHOP ON RECONSTRUCTION, REFORM AND ECONOMIC MAN.
AGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 19, 42 (1996) (sponsored by UNDP, the U.N.
Department of Development Support and Management Services and the Vienna Institute
for Comparative Economic Studies).
10. See id. at 42-57. See also the World Bank reports prepared for the Second
Donors' Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina. WORLD BANK E-T AL., BOSNIA AND HERZE-
GOVINA: TowARDs ECONOMIC REcOvERY 10-14 (Discussion Paper No. 1, 1996); WORLD
BANK Er AL., BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: THE P~ioiTy RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY PRO-
GRAM: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD (Discussion Paper No. 2, 1996).
11. A United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in February
1992 to facilitate cease-fire in Croatia and as a complement to ongoing international
mediation efforts. UNPROFOR's mandate was subsequently extended to Bosnia and
came to include responsibility for six designated "Safe Areas." The first Safe Area
declared was Srebrenica. See S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 111 1-4, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/819 (1993). The safe area concept was extended to Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde,
and Bihac with S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 11 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/824
(1993).
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1995.12 It began to look increasingly likely that U.S. troops would have to
intervene in Bosnia simply for the unexalted task of safely withdrawing the
troops of its allies. In the brutal event, this tension between the vulnerabil-
ity of U.N. peacekeepers and the need for forceful diplomacy was eased
when the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa fell to the Bosnian Serbs in July,
removing along with the thousands of civilians expelled or killed two of the
least tenable deployments of U.N. peacekeepers in the country.13
Involved governments now were ready to align their respective mili-
tary, humanitarian and political efforts behind a common objective. In
partial preparation for the possibility that the remaining U.N. peacekeepers
would have to be withdrawn, the U.N. Security Council authorized a mili-
tary Rapid Reaction Force in mid-June, which deployed around Sarajevo by
the end of July (and which would become instrumental in NATO's subse-
quent air campaign). Meeting in London in July, foreign ministers of the
U.N.'s troop-contributing countries ended the onerous "dual key" arrange-
ment that required civilian U.N. approval of NATO action and agreed to use
air power to deter an assault on Gorazde, the next safe area likely to be
attacked (at the same time, discreetly pulling U.N. peacekeepers out of the
enclave). 14 The Clinton Administration also indicated that American
troops might now be involved in enforcing whatever peace settlement was
reached. Taken together, these decisions signaled a new unity in interna-
tional diplomacy and a willingness to back it by force to an unprecedented
degree.
Second, the United States began to recognize that it actually did "have
a dog in this fight," and developed, under the leadership of National Secur-
ity Adviser Anthony Lake, a serious strategy to bring about an end to the
12. After the first strike against a Serb ammunition depot near Pale on May 25, the
response was Serb bombardment of all U.N.-designated Safe Areas except Zepa: 71 peo-
ple were killed in Tuzla alone. After the second strike against the Serb depot on May 26,
the response was to take close to 400 U.N. personnel hostage over the following few
days. See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 982
(1995) and 987 (1995), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., %' 10-14, U.N. Doc. S/1995/444 (1995).
See also Stephen Engelberg & Eric Schmitt, Air Raids and U.N. Hostages Mark a Turn in
Bosnia's War, N.Y. TMEs, July 16, 1995, at Al.
13. Srebrenica fell on July 12, six days after the Serb assault began. Zepa fell on July
25. The assault on Srebrenica stands as one of the most atrocious events of the war.
Between 5,000 and 7,000 Muslim men are estimated to have been slaughtered during
the week in July in which the town was taken by Serb forces. Beyond the obvious
responsibility borne by Serb authorities for this blood-letting, many others have been
accused of contributory culpability: the commander of local Bosnian forces who never
arrived to help defend the town, the U.N. authorities who never managed to order the
close air support when it was desperately needed, and the U.S. authorities who are
alleged to have known in advance but to have done nothing to prevent the assault on the
town. On the U.N. role, see generally DAVID ROHDE, ENDG mE: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL
oF SEBaRnEcA, EutnoPa's WoRsT MAsSAcRE SINcE WoRLD W~AR I (1997). On what U.S.
authorities may have known, see Charles Lane & Thorn Shanker, Bosnia: What the CIA
Didn't Tell Us, N.Y. REy. BooKs 8, 14 (1996).
14. See SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 7, at 360. When defense of Gorazde was dis-
cussed in London, there was no mention of Zepa, which was under attack at the time.
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war.15 Until this point, the American response had been weak and vacillat-
ing at best. Under President Bush, the United States had been all too will-
ing to allow Europeans to take the lead in a crisis that they claimed as their
own but were demonstrably incapable of handling. Under President Clin-
ton, the United States was far too inclined to issue outraged statements that
something be done and to blame its European allies for tying American
hands when his Administration was unwilling to take any real risks on
Bosnia's behalf-indeed, far fewer than those same European allies, who
maintained thousands of their own troops on Balkan ground.
The seeds of an American strategy to bring cease-fire to Bosnia began
when the United States brokered the tactical re-alliance between Bosniacs
and Bosnian Croats. Initially both at the receiving end of the Bosnian Serb
campaign, Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats became open adversaries by the
spring of 1993,16 their antagonism heavily shadowed by allegations that
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Milosevic were
playing an end-game to divide Bosnia between themselves. When this sec-
ond front emerged between the government and Bosnian Croats, actively
backed by Croatia, it became even more remote that a territorial formula
could be found which would simultaneously provide the basis for a viable,
unitary Bosnian state and satisfy the separatist objectives of Serbs and
Croats both. In March 1994, this Bosniac-Croat split was provisionally
resolved with heavy American backing through the "Washington Agree-
ment," which committed Bosnian Croats and Muslims to unite in a post-
war "Federation." More critical at the time, it bound the two in a de facto
military alliance to roll back Serb territorial gains. While the United States
discreetly worked with the Croatian army, Croatia allowed arms and equip-
ment to slip via Croatia to Bosnian forces.17
To the Croatian card, Washington added the Serbian, recognizing Pres-
ident Milosevic as the key broker on the Serbian side of the equation. The
Americans now worked from the assumption that Bosnia would contain
both the Bosniac-Croat Federation and a quasi-independent Republika Srp-
ska, and that both entities would be allowed to establish "special" relation-
ships with neighboring Croatia and Serbia, respectively.
15. After U.S. Secretary of State James Baker traveled to Belgrade and Zagreb on June
21, 1991 in an eleventh-hour effort to defuse the crisis over Croatia and Slovenia, he
explained the absence of U.S. interests in Yugoslavia with the phrase: "We don't have a
dog in this fight." See SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 7, at 201.
16. The full throttle confrontation that began in April 1993 has been partially attrib-
uted to the Bosnian government's rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the terms of
which were particularly favorable to Bosnian Croats. See, e.g., Misha Glenny, Yugoslavia:
The Great Fall, N.Y. REv. BooKs 56, 63 (1995). Though a contributing cause, active
Bosniac-Croat conflict began months before Vance-Owen was revealed and had in fact
been presaged by mutual hostilities from the time Yugoslavia began to disintegrate. Par-
ticularly informative on this subject is Chapter 22 in SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 7, at
291-302.
17. This was not just about Bosnia, since Serbs in Croatia still held the territory that
they had gained in 1991-92 in Krajina and Western Slavonia, where the autonomist Serb
rebellion began in 1990, and in Eastern Slavonia.
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Third, and largely as a result of U.S. efforts, the military balance on
the ground changed dramatically between the spring and fall of 1995,
bringing the territorial holdings of the warring parties into remarkably
close alignment with the proposed basis for negotiation. 18 Starting in May,
Serb forces suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the Croatian and
Bosnian armies that significantly changed their calculus at the bargaining
table and that also represented a new level of U.S. commitment to the Croa-
tian military, which at this stage was being openly trained by un-official
American advisers. On May 1, the Croatian Army retook Serb-occupied
territory in Western Slavonia, defying resident U.N. forces in this "U.N.
Protected Area." 19 On August 4, it launched Operation Storm, an offensive
that toppled the self-proclaimed "Krajina Serb Republic" in just two days,
sending close to 150,000 Serb civilians fleeing into Serb-held Bosnia and
Serbia.20 Through the early fall, the Bosnian Army advanced dramatically
on Serb positions. As EU negotiator David Owen described the changing
situation which began in September: "Thereafter, day by day, the map
altered."21 Up until this point, Serb forces had held a commanding posi-
tion territorially, having seized nearly two-thirds of Bosnian territory
within the first month of the Bosnian war-which made it exceedingly diffi-
cult to extract concessions on the basis of anything less-and controlling
almost one-third of Croatia, in Western Slavonia, Krajina and Eastern
Slavonia.
The final factor smoothing the path to Dayton was the international
community's new willingness to use force, especially air power, as a part-
ner to diplomacy. Various explanations account for the under-use of
armed force to respond to the Yugoslav wars, from the nationally parochial
through the bureaucratically predisposed and militarily arcane, to the
ontologically confused. Legal authorizations to use force certainly existed,
not least the provision for individual and collective self-defense in the U.N.
Charter, though this was arguably contravened by the existence of a U.N.
arms embargo on the region beginning in September of 1991.22 The U.N.
Security Council Resolutions establishing the six Safe Areas in Bosnia had
18. U.S. and European mediators were advocating as a basis for settlement that Bos-
niac and Croat forces would hold 51% of Bosnia's territory, and Serb forces the remain-
ing 49%. The 51:49 formula had been floated by Contact Group negotiators in July
1994 but was rejected at the time. See DAVID OwEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY 279-86 (1995).
19. The U.N. Protected Areas (UNPAs), all in Croatia, were part of UNPROFOR's
original mandate and distinct from the Safe Areas later established in Bosnia.
20. Another 50,000 soldiers fled as well. UNHCR Special Envoy SorenJessen-Peter-
sen, Remarks at a Joint UNHCR-IPA Conference entitled Healing the Wounds: Refugees,
Reconstruction and Reconciliation (June 30-July 1, 1996).
21. OwEN, supra note 18, at 335.
22. See S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., ' 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991). In
1993, the Council drafted a resolution that was never adopted, which called for lifting
the embargo against the Bosnian government on the grounds that it violated Bosnia's
inherent right of self-defense. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25997 (1993).
U.S. Congressional advocates of lifting the arms embargo also based much of their case
on Bosnia's right to defend itself.
Cornell International Law Journal
authorized the use of all necessary measures to protect them,23 and NATO
had declared that violators of the military exclusion zone surrounding each
Safe Area would be subject to air attack. Later authorization for close air
support of U.N. peacekeepers also enabled the robust use of force. Finally,
even baseline rules of engagement permitted U.N. peacekeepers to resort to
force in self-defense, though this has rarely been interpreted to go beyond
physical defense of the peacekeeper to protection of the peacekeeper's
mandate.
Not until the end of the summer of 1995, however, did the interna-
tional community turn seriously to the use of military force to end the
Bosnian war. Obstacles to the use of NATO air power had been removed
with the repositioning of UNPROFOR troops, both forcibly in the case of
Srebrenica and Zepa, and voluntarily in the case of Gorazde. 24 Bosnian
Serb forces also provided NATO with a justification for the air strikes, with
a mortar attack on August 28 that killed thirty-seven in Sarajevo's
marketplace.
The narrative of the last days of war indicate the effectiveness of the
subsequent air campaign, in tandem with Bosniac and Croat military
gains: NATO and the recently deployed Rapid Reaction Force began heavy
air bombardment of Serb positions around Sarajevo on August 29 and 30,
which resumed between September 5 to 12. On September 8, talks in
Geneva produced a Statement of Agreed Basic Principles which accepted as
a basis for settlement a territorial division of 51% under Bosniac-Croat
control and 49% under Bosnian Serb control and a political subdivision of
Bosnia into two co-equal "Entities." As the Bosnian Army and Croat forces
advanced on Serb positions in western Bosnia, a cease-fire agreement for
Sarajevo was reached on September 14, and Further Agreed Basic Princi-
ples established on September 26. Renewed Serb offensives in October
were met by a resumption of NATO air strikes between October 4 and 10,
until a cease-fire came into effect mid-month. On November 1, proximity
talks began at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio; and on
November 20, Croatian President Tudjman, Serbian President Milosevic,
Bosnian President Izetbegovic, and President Kresimir Zubak for the Bos-
23. See S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993) (author-
izing UNPROFOR and regional organizations to use force to defend the safe havens);
S.C. Res. 844, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/844 (1993) (authorizing the
military reinforcement of UNPROFOR).
24. See, for example, OwEN, supra note 18, at 331, describing the situation at the
end of August 1995:
For the first time since the autumn of 1992 UNPROFOR was no longer spread
out across the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina and vulnerable to Bosnian Serb
retaliation and hostage-taking. UNPROFOR was out of Zepa, Srebrenica and
Gorazde. Bihac was now safe. There were no significant U.N. forces in Serb
controlled areas anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina .... It was inevitable, there-
fore, that the U.N. and NATO would take action against the Bosnian Serbs for
the mortar bomb attack, which was a flagrant breach of the heavy weapons
exclusion zone in Sarajevo.
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niac-Croat Federation initialed the Dayton Agreement. On December 14,
the General Framework Agreement for Peace was formally signed in Paris.
I. Dayton's Essential Elements
The Dayton Agreement effected a compromise between two contending
visions of Bosnia: the first, a single state with room and rights for a mix of
nationalities; the second, an effective division into three nationally homog-
enous mini-states. 25 Dayton's mediators sought to have the first vision
trump the second; however, the choices made by its implementers have
helped tip the balance the other way. It is worthwhile to review several key
provisions of the settlement before moving on to what implementation has
and has not accomplished and the reasons why. Virtually every one of
these provisions, as might be expected, left significant room for interpreta-
tion in implementation, and nowhere in the Agreement proper exists a stra-
tegic conception of which provision should take priority over any other.
A. Political Provisions
The political resolution to Bosnia's conflict was two-fold: first, to establish
an institutional balance between those who favored an independent uni-
tary state and those who sought significant degrees of autonomy from it;
and second, to begin a process of democratization which had been side-
lined when Yugoslavia dissolved in a series of wars.
The institutional formula creates a single Bosnian state that is divided
between two "Entities," the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the latter being an uneasy truce between Bosniacs and
Croats since its formation in 1994. Bosnia's new constitution is inscribed
in the Agreement 26 and establishes an intricate set of power-sharing insti-
tutions at the national and entity levels, ironically very similar to those that
failed to manage the rivalries which tore apart both Bosnia and Yugoslavia.
Under the peace agreement, these joint institutions are the primary mecha-
nisms to manage tension between the pull toward unity and the push
toward partition. These were to begin functioning with the first post-war
national elections.
National elections, themselves, play a pivotal role in Dayton's inven-
tory of provisions, with other components of democratization-such as
25. The tension underlying this compromise meant that the final political outcome
for Bosnia remained fundamentally uncertain, as it still does. Susan L. Woodward was
an early and outspoken commentator on this issue of Dayton's open-endedness. See
SUsAN L. WOODWARD, IMPLEMENTING PEACE IN BosNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: A POsT-DAYTON
PRIMER AND MEMORANDUM OF WARNING 10-13 (Brookings Discussion Papers, 1996);
Susan L. Woodward, America's Bosnia Policy: The Work Ahead, PoucY BRIEF (Brookings
Institution Policy Brief No. 2, 1996).
In this, the Dayton agreement differed qualitatively from the other peace accord
reached that fall between Croatia and Serbia concerning the final status of Eastern Sla-
vonia. See Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 92, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1995/951
(1995).
26. Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 4, 35 I.L.M. at 117-28.
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strengthening the rule of law, protecting basic rights and liberties, and
encouraging independent media-scattered through less enforceable parts
of the Agreement. Annex 3 commits the Parties to provide basic conditions
for free, fair and democratic elections, and further authorizes the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to certify whether
these conditions exist and to supervise the preparation and execution of
elections themselves.27 A Provisional Electoral Commission comprised of
both Bosnian and international representatives was also established, and
was given, among its assignments, the critical responsibility of determining
rules for voter registration. 28 Although conditions for free, fair and demo-
cratic elections are itemized in Article 1 and in an attached OSCE docu-
ment, greater emphasis is placed on the timing of elections than on
establishing their necessary conditions.29 Moreover, no specific mecha-
nisms are provided to ensure that the results of elections will be imple-
mented. The holding of national elections, significantly, was the only
strictly civilian provision of the Dayton Agreement that had an explicit
deadline-in this case, no later than nine months after the Agreement's
entry into force. 30
B. Military Provisions
The military planks of the Agreement primarily secure the cease-fire line
and provide for regional stabilization and confidence-building measures. 31
They call for separation of armed forces along either side of an Inter-Entity
Boundary Line (IEBL) that divides Serb areas from the Bosniac-Croat Fed-
eration. The provisions further lay out a detailed calendar of obligations
governing when the parties must cease hostilities, withdraw foreign forces,
re-deploy both forces and heavy weapons, exchange prisoners, and estab-
lish mechanisms for cooperation.32 They also authorize deployment of a
multinational "Implementation Force" (IFOR) under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter to implement the territorial and military provisions, most of
which were scheduled to be in place within six months.33
In general, the military annexes focus on inter-Entity security, leaving
un-addressed those frontlines that still existed within the Federation
between Bosniac and Croat forces or within Republika Srpska between
Serb authorities and any still-resident non-Serb population.34 However, in
27. Id. Annex 3, arts. 1-I, 35 I.L.M. at 115.
28. Id. art. III, 11 2(b), 35 I.L.M. at 115.
29. Id. art. I, 35 I.L.M. at 115; Id. Attachment to Annex 3 on Elections, 35 I.L.M. at
117.
30. Or, September 15, 1996. Id. Annex 3, art. II, 4, 35 I.L.M. at 115.
31. See generally id. Annexes 1-A, 1-B, 2, 35 I.L.M. at 91-114.
32. Id. Annex 1-A, arts. III-V, art. VI, I 9(b)(2), art. IX, 35 I.L.M. at 93-98; Id. Annex
1-B, arts. Il-IV, 35 I.L.M. at 109-10.
33. IFOR was a NATO-led force, under the authority and command of the North
Atlantic Council, though it included troops from non-NATO members.
34. Parties are obliged not to "threaten or use force against the other Entity," or
engage in "offensive operations," which is defined as "projecting forces or fire forward of
a Party's own lines." Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1-A, art. I, c 2(a), art. I, '1
1, 35 I.L.M. at 92-93.
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a section elaborating the Cessation of Hostilities to which the Parties must
comply, the Agreement includes with its military provisions a broad array
of security concerns that go beyond the strictly inter-entity or narrowly
military.35 Here, the text recognizes that non-military actors can have mili-
tary capability and should therefore be subject to the same obligations:
"Each Party shall ensure that all personnel and organizations with military
capability under its control or within territory under its control, including
armed civilian groups, national guards, army reserves, military police, and
the Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Police (MUP) comply with this
Annex."36 It also recognizes that even those without military capability
can pose a security problem, thus: "The Parties also commit themselves to
disarm and disband all armed civilian groups, except for authorized police
forces."37 Most significantly, it requires that: "The Parties shall provide a
safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by
maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance
with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internation-
ally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking
such other measures as appropriate."38 Additionally, the Parties are
required to cooperate completely with all international personnel, "includ-
ing investigators, advisors, monitors, observers, or other personnel in Bos-
nia pursuant to the General Framework Agreement. '39
Parallel to these obligations placed upon the Parties, are responsibili-
ties assigned to IFOR. Military Annex 1-A enumerates several supporting
tasks for the IFOR, which include assistance to other international person-
nel, specifically naming the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR). 40 More important, these additional tasks call for IFOR "to
observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations,
refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate vio-
lence to life and person."4 1 This item carries enormous significance if real-
ized in practice, particularly if read in conjunction with paragraphs four
and five of the same article which respectively allow NATO to use its own
judgment to establish any "additional duties and responsibilities for the
IFOR in implementing this Annex,"42 and which grant IFOR's Commander,
"without interference or permission of any Party, [the authority] to do all
that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of
military force to protect the IFOR and to carry out the responsibilities listed
35. See id. art. II, 35 I.L.M. at 92-93.
36. Id. 1, 35 L.M. at 93.
37. Id. [ 3, 35 I.L.M. at 93.
38. Id. (emphasis added). This phrase repeats identically the language in Bosnia's
new Constitution. Id. Annex 4, art. III, c 2(c), 35 LL.M. at 120.
39. Id. Annex 1-A, art. II, 1 1-4, 35 I.L.M. at 92-93. The General Framework Agree-
ment refers explicitly to "investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other viola-
tions of international humanitarian law." Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, GFA, art. IX,
35 I.L.M. at 90.
40. Id. art. VI, 3(c), 35 I.L.M. at 97.
41. Id. art. VI, 3(d), 35 I.L.M. at 97 (emphasis added).
42. Id. 4, 35 I.L.M. at 97.
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above in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4."43
Left for future resolution among the territorial provisions was author-
ity over Brcko, the town that sits astride the narrow Posavina corridor con-
necting northern and eastern Republika Srpska, and to which both Serbs
and Bosniacs lay primary claim. The Parties are required to settle its fate
by "final and binding" arbitration within one year of the Dayton Agree-
ment's signing.4 4
Standing in ambiguous relationship to the military provisions are
those relating to Bosnia's police. On the one hand, the military Annexes
obligate the Parties to ensure civilian security and maintain professional
standards of civilian law enforcement, and ask IFOR to respond to deliber-
ate violence and prevent interference with civilian movement. On the other
hand, the only explicit mechanism to ensure that police respect basic
human rights and professional standards is the presence of a U.N. Interna-
tional Police Task Force, authorized under Annex 11.
4 5
C. Human Rights, Refugees and Displaced Persons
Since the war began, and since its end, a pitched debate has taken place
among international observers as to whether stability in Bosnia rests on a
partitioned country or a united one. Frequently, this debate revolves
around speculation about what the popular traffic will bear: in its most
simplistic form, one side argues that Bosnians have been implacable ene-
mies for centuries and prefer ethnic separation, while the other argues that
Bosnians have lived in a multinational idyll for centuries and want now to
recreate it. Yet, the only way to gain purchase on what people genuinely
want-and are therefore likely to sustain-is to enable them to choose
under conditions of genuine openness and security, which Dayton princi-
pally addresses in its provisions on human rights and voluntary return.
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are addressed in Annex 4,
Bosnia's new constitution, and Annex 6.46 .Although more ink is expended
on the institutional balance of power among Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs,
the post-war constitution outlines a full array of rights and freedoms. 47 An
annex to the constitution also lists fifteen international human rights
agreements to which Bosnia's government must conform. 4 8 The constitu-
tion itself says little about implementation, though there are provisions for
international monitoring and, in the context of the Agreement as a whole,
there is ample room for external efforts to strenuously encourage
compliance.
Annex 6 expands on the constitutional guarantees, pledging the Par-
ties to abide by international standards of human rights, to respect the
43. Id. 5, 35 I.L.M. at 97 (emphasis added).
44. Or, December 15, 1996. Id. Annex 2, art. V, c 5, 35 I.L.M. at 113.
45. Id. Annex 11, 35 I.L.M. at 149-52.
46. See generally id. Annex 4, 35 I.L.M. at 117-28; id. Annex 6, 35 I.L.M. at 130-36.
47. See generally id. Annex 4, art. II, 35 IL.M. at 119-20 (covering "Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms").
48. See id. Annex 4, Annex I, 35 lL.M. at 126.
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series of conventions designed to protect these rights, and to fully cooper-
ate with international human rights efforts, including the work of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.49 The Parties also
commit themselves to establishing a joint Commission on Human Rights,
comprised of an Ombudsman and a Human Rights Chamber, designed to
evolve over the course of five years from an office supported by significant
international involvement to a regular, functioning and fully Bosnian
institution.50
The Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons' 1 is possibly the
most radical provision in the entire accord, since full implementation could
amount to a flat-out reversal of the course of the war.
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their
homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property
of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be
compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.5 2
Fulfilling these two sentences alone would dramatically affect all other ele-
ments of the Dayton package, especially those related to power-sharing and
elections. In order to realize this right of voluntary return for Bosnia's 2.5
million refugees and displaced persons, the Parties commit to an extraordi-
narily progressive course of action. They promise to refrain from harass-
ment, intimidation, persecution, and discrimination; prevent others from
engaging in such acts; repeal legislation and end administrative practices
that discriminate against minorities either in intent or effect; prevent or
suppress hate speech whether committed by public officials of private citi-
zens; protect minority populations; and prosecute and punish anyone with
public responsibilities (specifically listing all security institutions) who
violates the rights of minorities.' 3 Annex 7 also establishes a commission
comprised of Bosnian and international members to deal with property
claims and their just compensation.' 4
D. The Role of the International Community
The Dayton Accord not only pledges Bosnia's warring parties and their
most influential neighbors to a settlement, it also commits various mem-
bers of the international community to an unprecedented level of involve-
ment in helping those parties implement its military and civilian
provisions. Dayton offers a model of third-party implementation in which
international military and civilian efforts are assigned to "lead agencies" by
sector. Military provisions, as described, would be supervised by the
60,000-strong IFOR, which was followed in December of 1996 by a 31,000-
troop NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) whose mandate is set to expire on
49. Id. Annex 6, 35 I.L.M. at 130-36.
50. Id. arts. II-XIV, 35 L.M. at 131-35.
51. Id. Annex 7, 35 I.L.M. at 13641.
52. Id. art. 1, 1 1, 35 I.L.M. at 137.
53. See id. c1 1-3, 35 I.L.M. at 137 (covering the basic obligations described).
54. See also id. art. VII, 35 I.L.M. at 138 (establishing the Commission for Displaced
Persons and Refugees).
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June 30, 1998.55 Among the wide range of civilian activities, police moni-
toring and training would be handled by the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and an International Police Task Force (IPTF),
whose peak strength reached 2,027 unarmed personnel by the summer of
1997.56 Elections were to be managed by the OSCE, which also oversees
regional stabilization and confidence-building measures. Dayton assigned
the return of refugees and displaced persons to the UNHCR, with invited
assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the
U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), and other humanitarian organiza-
tions. An independent international arbitrator would preside over the
Brcko process. Finally, human rights issues involved several implementing
organizations, including the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights.
Additional major responsibilities, not detailed in the Dayton Agreement
proper, included: EU administration of the city of Mostar, which was heav-
ily damaged by Croat-Bosniac fighting in 1993 and which remains divided
between its Croat west and its Bosniac east;5 7 and the management of
reconstruction by a combination of multilateral and bilateral financial
institutions, prominently led by the World Bank.
The panoply of civilian efforts are to be monitored and coordinated by
an international High Representative-a position filled from January 1996
to April 1997 by former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt, and since April
1997, by the Spanish diplomat Carlos Westendorp. The High Representa-
tive is .given minimal operational authority with which to exercise his
responsibility for coordinating international activities, particularly if coor-
dination is viewed as extending beyond information-sharing to developing
common strategies and implementing common plans. However, the High
Representative has authority as the interpreter of last resort of the Dayton
Agreement's civilian provisions and a capacity to establish new mecha-
nisms (such as commissions or task forces) to help him execute his man-
date.5 8 In addition, an inter-governmental Peace Implementation Council
55. During its operation, IFOR troop strength ranged near 50,000; to date, SFOR
troop strength has ranged between 31,000 and 36,500. Figures are cited in the monthly
reports submitted by NATO to the Security Council. See, e.g., Javier Solana, Eleventh
Report to the United Nations Security Council on IFOR Operations, U.N. SCOR, 51st
Sess., U.N.Doc. S/1996/880 (1996); Javier Solana, Monthly Report to the United Nations
Security Council on SFOR Operations, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 1 1, U.N.Doc. S/1997/718
(1997).
56. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH), U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3, U.N. Doc. S/1997/468 (1997).
57. This job was subsequently transferred to the United Nations and the Office of
the High Representative in late 1996. Cf. Dublin European Council- 13 and 14 December
1996- Presidency Conclusions, RAPID, Dec. 14, 1996, Annex III, available in LEXIS, News
Library, RAPID File.
58. "The High Representative is the final authority in theater regarding interpreta-
tion of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement." Dayton
Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 10, art. V, 35 I.L.M. at 148, which is analogous to the
IFOR Commander's being named the "final authority in theatre regarding interpretation
of this agreement on the military aspects of the peace settlement." Id. Annex 1-A, art.
XII, 35 1.L.M. at 100.
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(PIC) was created to oversee the whole process and "to mobilize interna-
tional support behind Dayton implementation. '5 9 The five-nation Contact
Group also provides an ongoing opportunity to harmonize the diplomatic
efforts of its members and exert appropriate leverage on the Parties.
All told, at least seven major international organizations-NATO, U.N.,
OSCE, EU, UNHCR, ICRC and the World Bank-possess principal respon-
sibilities for peace implementation in Bosnia, not counting the active
involvement of interested national governments, various special envoys,
bilateral initiatives and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) operating on the scene.
E. What Has Been Missing
Notwithstanding the Dayton Agreement's comprehensiveness, several criti-
cal elements are missing from its 130 pages of detailed text. In their collec-
tive absence, Dayton has no strategy for implementing its own numerous
provisions, let alone for moving beyond them to address issues that its text
leaves unresolved. First, it provides no effective mechanism for dealing
with continued conflict between the Bosniac and, Croat communities that
make up the Federation. Should joint institutions be less than fully func-
tioning, and complete cooperation from these parties less than forthcom-
ing, it is left to international implementers to develop strategies and
instruments for dealing with any obstruction. The beleaguered experience
of the European Union (EU) in Mostar, and of the U.N. and Office of the
High Representative since they took over from the EU late in 1996, reveals
the weight of this burden. The lack of attention to intra-Federation conflict
is also symbolically problematic: when the ostensible goal is to strengthen
a unitary state and to work to diminish mutual distrust among its three
communities, it does not send a helpful message to devote most interna-
tional attention to only one of Bosnia's dividing lines.
Second, the Agreement provides no direction to the Parties or to the
implementers on the relative importance of its various provisions or the
need to prioritize them, and no hint of the consequences should those pri-
orities remain unestablished or unwisely set. On the strictly military side,
the Agreement contains implicit priorities with its highly detailed calendar
to which the Parties must adhere. On the political and civilian side, how-
ever, the Agreement seriously imposes an explicit timetable on only two
obligations: reaching an arbitration decision on the status of Brcko, and
holding national elections. 60 Aside from these provisions, the peace agree-
ment amounts to a laundry list of critical issues-demobilization and
59. Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference Held at Lancaster House,
London, on 8 and 9 December 1995, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., ' 3, U.N. Doc. S/1995/1029
(1995). The PIC was created out of the remnants of the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia that had been in operation since August 1991.
60. Other civilian provisions have deadlines but, in practice, have been much less
consequential, largely because they are more technical or more easily obstructed. One
example is the obligation to bring existing constitutions into conformity with the Dayton
Constitution. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 4, art. XII, c12, 35 I.L.M. at
125.
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police reform, elections, constitutional reform, human rights guarantees,
refugee return, and so on-without any light shed on the relationship
among them. What effect are elections likely to have, for instance, if held
in the absence of basic civilian security or confidence among Bosnia's dis-
placed that they will be able to return? What is the impact of pushing the
issue of return in an economic and security context which only plausibly
allows them to return to majority areas? Can one talk seriously about
police reform and human rights should NATO choose not to focus on that
part of its mandate that involves armed civilian groups, reservists or
paramilitaries? The Dayton Agreement need not have been expected to
make such judgments, but its international implementers could not avoid
them.
Third, the Agreement provides no guidance on how to manage its chief
contradiction: namely, it both stabilizes the lines of confrontation between
Serb and Federation areas and within the Federation, and derives political
rights from this division; at the same time, it obligates Parties to respect a
right of return which could amount to reversing those lines entirely. Here,
especially, the international community would have an opportunity to
show whether it has overcome the ambivalence it manifested during the
Bosnian war, or whether it is still of mixed minds about the nature and
level of its commitment to an independent, multi-national Bosnia.
For these lacunae, the Dayton Agreement should not be faulted so
much as supplemented. Like other peace agreements arrived at by compro-
mise and heavy third-party arm-twisting, it contains ambiguity and tension
among its provisions.61 This need not make it fatally flawed, as some crit-
ics have argued, only typical. 62 As a typical negotiated settlement, how-
ever, the Dayton Agreement places a unique burden on the period of
implementation, which will unavoidably be treated by Parties as an oppor-
tunity to obstruct, revise and sabotage the Agreement to which they have
committed themselves.63 As Bosnia's experience demonstrates all too
dearly, implementing a complex peace agreement is a highly creative enter-
prise, in which interpretations and decisions have enormous practical con-
sequence. The judgments and actions of third parties will be decisive in
such a setting, either enabling spoilers or curbing them, either giving
robust support to those genuinely committed to peace or weakening them
with inadequate assistance.
61. Most scholars of civil war and its termination agree that ending such conflicts by
negotiated compromise instead of victory by one side is harder both to accomplish-of
57 civil wars begun and ended between 1945 and 1993, one-quarter ended with negoti-
ated settlement, or fourteen compared to the forty-three wars which ended with military
victory-and to sustain-civil war resumed in 50% of the cases where war ended via
negotiation, compared to only 15% where war ended in one side's victory. See Roy
Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, 89 Am.
POL. Sci. REv. 681, 684-85 (1995).
62. Hutchison, for instance, calls on Clinton to "reconvene the Dayton parties to
reassess the accords." Hutchison, supra note 2, at A31.
63. On the challenge of implementing peace agreements after civil wars, see Stephen
John Stedman & Donald Rothchild, Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-Term
Commitment, IN'L PEACEKEEPING, Summer 1996, at 17 (Jeremy Ginifer ed.).
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IV. The Progress and Impact of Implementation
This Article's main claim is that decisions made by international imple-
menters have had a decisive impact on whether and what kind of peace
works in Bosnia.64 The Dayton Agreement, as described, offered neither a
clear political outcome nor a strategy for building peace. What it offered
was a cease-fire amid a daunting set of challenges: parties whose objectives
had not changed and who remained in power; plans for power-sharing
which threatened to consolidate national exclusion rather than mitigate it;
and social wounds from a war fought with extraordinary cruelty. While
international implementers can hardly be asked to build peace in such a
context on their own, they can legitimately be asked to put their efforts
coherently and effectively behind a well-conceived course of action. In
short, they can be asked to define a set of objectives that will guide their
work with Bosnia's parties and peoples, and to design a strategy to achieve
those goals.
Generally, there is some merit in the conventional view that military
implementation has been a success while civilian implementation has flag-
ged. Certainly, those military provisions to which NATO leadership
devoted their resources have been efficiently implemented according to the
agreed-upon timetable. The IEBL has been stabilized (with the important
exception of Brcko) and multiple small adjustments to it have been made
peacefully; troops and heavy weapons have been re-deployed as required
and submit to regular inspections by NATO-led troops; foreign forces have
basically been removed; and there has not been a single military-on-mili-
tary clash since the war ended. This is no minor accomplishment, and no
subsequent criticism should eclipse NATO's tremendous achievement in
stabilizing Bosnia's cease-fire.
On the civilian side, progress has been much more uneven. National
elections were held on schedule, in mid-September 1996, although with
serious problems as will be discussed below. 65 Bosnia's joint power-shar-
ing institutions also began to function by late 1996.66 Although these
structures have been slow to accomplish much substantively, and have
been characterized as much by backsliding and recalcitrance as by active
cooperation, this was to be expected. After all, they represent an institu-
tional attempt to reconcile parties whose aims never changed, but who
were convinced by circumstance that the battlefield was not the best place
to pursue them. Their slow and frustrated progress does not make them a
64. This is not the place to offer a full review of Dayton implementation, and several
first-rate assessments already exist. Some of the best work has been done by the Interna-
tional Crisis Group (ICG) in Sarajevo, which has produced over thirty substantial
reports on major aspects of implementation since its work in Bosnia began in early
1996. See generally ICG Crisis web (visited Nov. 6, 1997) <http://www.intl-crisis-
group.org>.
65. See infra Part IV, Section B.
66. Their functioning has been repeatedly obstructed from different sides, particu-
larly Serb and Croat, over everything from timing of meetings to location. Just recendy in
October 1997, the Council of Ministers stalled over the question of a permanent loca-
tion for their meetings.
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failure; both the Parties and their international interlocutors deserve credit
that they work at all.67 In addition, there have been some positive steps on
returning Bosnia's refugees and displaced persons, particularly to majority
areas.68 A fair amount of reconstruction has occurred as well, though little
has translated into widespread job creation because of a greater emphasis
on infrastructure.
More troublesome, the conditions that have pertained throughout Bos-
nia and Herzegovina since the war stopped, especially in Serb and Croat-
controlled areas, still work actively against the resumption of "normal con-
ditions of life" called for in the Dayton Agreement. Residents face what
UNHCR has characterized as a "climate of fear and intimidation,"69 espe-
cially in minority areas; the power of nationalist authorities remains essen-
tially unbroken; and dynamics pushing toward effective partition are still
stronger than those pulling toward integration. Perhaps worse, choices
made and priorities set by international parties during implementation
have contributed powerfully to the bleaker side of the picture.
A. Interpreting the Military Mandate
Since the war ended, minority residents and opposition political figures
have been targets of systematic intimidation and harassment, which is
often attributed to popular gangs but which demonstrably enjoy acquies-
cence or active support from authorities. Many incidents occur at night,
when international observers are the most remote. Empty houses are
destroyed so that refugees cannot return to them; returnees are harassed
and driven out shortly after they arrive; minority residents are forcibly
expelled; minorities are detained at roadside checkpoints, threatened with
arrest as suspected war criminals and sometimes beaten while in police
custody; mosques and churches continue to be vandalized; haystacks have
been burned, agricultural property damaged and livestock and pets
poisoned.70 Dozens of incidents worthy of public report have occurred
between Dayton's signing andJune 1997, not counting the burning of Sara-
jevo's suburbs and exodus of approximately 60,000 Serbs in early 1996.71
67. The Office of the High Representative especially deserves credit, as it has worked
particularly hard on the issue of getting joint institutions up and running.
68. The phrases "majority/minority areas" or "majority/minority return" are short-
hand to describe return of individuals to areas where they belong to the majority
national group or where they are in the minority.
69. UNITED NATIONS, HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES, HUMANITARIAN ISSUES WORKING
GROUP, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: REPATRIATION AND RETURN OPERATION 1997, 1 40, U.N.
Doc. HIWG/97/2 (1997) [hereinafter UNHCR REPORT].
70. Interview with U.N. Civil Affairs Officer, in Sarajevo (Nov. 1996).
71. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF
THE HIGH COMMISSIONR'S PROGRAMME, UPDATE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FOR-
MER YUGOSLAVIA, 1 3, U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.18 (1997). The infamous burning of
the suburbs began in early March 1997 in anticipation of their transfer to Federation
authority. See, e.g., Dan De Luce, Fires Burn in Lawless Sarajevo Suburb, REUTERS EUR.
COMMUNITY REP., Mar. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; Chris
Hedges, Sarajevo District Burns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at A6.
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Most incidents involve the prospect of return. The following are sadly
representative. Between May and July of 1996, hundreds of Bosniacs were
expelled from Serb-controlled Teslic after a steady wave of verbal intimida-
tion, bombings, beatings and threats; 72 Croats who remained in Bosniac-
controlled Bugojno were forcibly evicted in July 1996;73 in October, 150
demonstrators stoned a commercial bus making an inaugural run across
Croat-controlled territory to East Mostar while police stood by;74 also in
October, 250 displaced Serbs were prevented from visiting their pre-war
homes in Croat-controlled Drvar, and thirty-five homes were subsequently
set on fire;75 and ninety-six homes and two mosques were destroyed in
Prijedor after UNHCR gave Serb authorities a list of Bosniacs who wished
to visit their property.76 All such incidents are paralleled by a pattern of
arbitrary arrests, detentions and harassment by authorities. Moreover,
every episode carries a double punch: the event itself and the fear that
similar attacks will follow.
While the Parties are primarily responsible for the range and fre-
quency of these incidents, significant responsibility also belongs to NATO's
political leadership which decided at an early stage that this arena of con-
frontation was outside the bounds of its mandate, even though there was
every reason to include it.77 The military annexes of the Dayton Agree-
ment detail a security agenda extending beyond the strictly military, which
is reflected in the broad mandate assigned to IFOR and SFOR. As earlier
described, the military provisions recognize that a "cessation of hostilities"
includes providing safety and security for all civilians living in areas under
either Party's control, and that an array of actors beyond the military can
undermine that security. Thus NATO-led forces are asked to head the
security of civilian populations and are given robust means for fulfilling
72. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
ENVOY, INFORMATION Nom, at v (May 1996). See also Update: Non-Compliance with the
Dayton Accords, 8 HuMAN RIGHTS WATcH/HELsINm REPORT 5 (1996).
73. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/56 (1997).
74. See Office of the High Representative, BULL. No. 22, 1 9, (Oct. 24, 1996) <http://
www.ohr.int/bulletins/b961024.htm>.
75. The Drvar incident was repeated almost identically in May 1997, when twenty-
four houses were set ablaze following a visit from an international mediator who called
for Serbs to be able to return. See, e.g., Patrick Moore, Croats Block Serb Refugees from
Returning Home, OMRI DAILY DIGEST, (Open Media Research Institute, Prague, Czech
Republic), Oct. 15, 1996, at 1. See also House Burnings: Obstruction of the Right to
Return to Drvar, ICG BOSNIA REP. No. 24 (Int'l Crisis Group, London, U.K.), June 16,
1997, at 1.
76. See, e.g., Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, ICG BOSNIA REP. No. 23 (Int'l Crisis Group, London, U.K.), May 1,
1997, at 43.
77. It should be made plain that all criticism of the NATO-led forces in Bosnia is
directed at NATO's political leadership, not at the force commanders or troops on the
ground who operate within a particularly tight chain of command that gives them little
interpretive leeway in fulfilling their mandate.
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the full range of their responsibilities. 7s
IFOR's, then SFOR's, primary responsibility has been to ensure that
the Parties meet their military obligations, which clearly include these
extra-military components. The loophole is that the NATO-led force is per-
mitted but not obligated to carry out these responsibilities: "the IFOR shall
have the right to fulfill its supporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned
principal tasks and available resources. '79 At the time of its deployment,
IFOR was heavily shadowed by the U.N.'s experience in Somalia and there-
fore determined to refrain from anything that looked like "nation-building"
or "mission-creeping."80 This specter encouraged not only a strict segrega-
tion of IFOR's operation from civilian implementation, but also an unjusti-
fiably minimalist reading of its own military responsibilities. In the event,
NATO's political leadership chose to restrict its focus to the most narrowly
military components of its mandate, with the upshot that a heavily armed
multi-national force of close to 60,000 troops (under SFOR, 31,000 troops)
has presided over a protracted "security gap" through which Bosnian civil-
ians have fallen by the day. With them, have fallen opportunities to rebuild
a state with room for multiple nationalities.
Moreover, although this pattern of violence is not strictly military, it is
not non-military either. Targeting civilians to move them forcibly from one
part of the country to another closely resembles the coercive instruments
used for the same purpose during the war. That it is not soldiers, per se,
who are targeting civilians is also less significant a distinction than it might
appear. Recall that throughout the wars of the former Yugoslavia, belliger-
ents had at their disposal paramilitary groups as well as regular and special
police which they developed and used with extreme ferocity. Civilians and
their property were primary targets of military campaigns, the campaigns
themselves waged by a combination of paramilitary, police and reserve
forces along with regular military units.
Nor is there evidence that this post-Dayton violence is beyond the con-
trol of political authorities. Just the opposite: in almost all incidents, local
authorities have been involved, either directly-as in February of this year,
when Croatian police in West Mostar fired into a crowd of unarmed Bos-
niac civilians attempting to visit a cemetery on a Muslim holiday, killing
one and injuring 20 more81-or indirectly, when local police fail to protect
78. Having been established under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Dayton
Agreement reiterates on several counts IFOR's authority to use any means necessary to
implement their mandate. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
79. Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1-A, art. VI, 1 3, 35 I.L.M. at 97.
80. Among other things, this led NATO governments to create the awkward distinc-
tion between "mission creep" and "mission evolution," in order to explain the extension
of their mandate under SFOR.
81. Remarkably, the incident was caught on film. For official reports on the inci-
dent by IPTF, the Office of the High Representative, and the Bosnian government, see,
for example, International Police Task Force, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., Annexes 1-2, U.N.
Doc. S/1997/204 (1997); Letter dated 7 March 1997from the Principal Deputy High Rep-
resentative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovinia
addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1997/201 (1997);
Letter dated 24 February 1997from the Principal Deputy High Representative addressed to
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civilians or their property when either have been targeted by armed groups.
As expressed in a statement of the PIC Steering Board inJune 1997, "[t]he
police not only frequently condone violence on ethnic and political
grounds, they are often responsible for the violations themselves." 82
Since summer 1997, sporadic incidents have hinted that NATO's
approach might be changing. In July, British troops moved against two
major figures indicted for war crimes, apprehending one and killing the
other after he resisted arrest, marked the first use of NATO force for this
purpose.83 In early August, SFOR began inspecting and confiscating weap-
ons from paramilitary special police units, making these units subject for
the first time to NATO oversight; and at month's end, NATO authorized
SFOR to take all necessary measures against inflammatory radio and televi-
sion broadcasters whenever requested by the High Representative. SFOR
has also been working more closely with the IPTF and taken some initia-
tives to provide greater protection to returning refugees.
The question now is whether NATO will learn the right lesson from its
nearly two years of conservatism to deploy its resources more productively
behind a strategy of peacebuilding in Bosnia. Unfortunately, it is not yet
clear whether these recent incidents amount to more than ad hoc responses
to issues of particular concern to SFOR. SFOR's new attention to the spe-
cial police, for instance, seems uniquely designed to weaken the forces pro-
tecting Dr. Karadzic and other hard-line Serb leaders, especially
the Chair of the Presidency and a Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovinia,
U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1997/183 (1997); International Police Task Force,
Mostar: Human Rights and Security Situation, I January- 15 February 1997, U.N. SCOR,
52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1997/351 (1997).
82. Conclusions Reached at Sintra, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 1 55, U.N. Doc. S/1997/
434 (1997). Several months earlier, recognition that police were the primary abusers of
human rights led to a new authorization in December 1996 for IPTF to conduct
independent investigations.
[I]t has become apparent that most of the violations of human rights which
occur in Bosnia and Herzegovina (by some estimates as many as 70 per cent) are
the work of the police forces of the Entities themselves. This creates the need for
independent investigation of such cases. It was therefore proposed by the
United Nations at the second Peace Implementation Conference that this
responsibility should be entrusted to IPTF, a proposal which attracted wide-
spread support and was incorporated in the Conclusions of the London
Conference.
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 11 15, U.N. Doc. S/1996/1017
(1996).
83. Both men were based in the northwestern town of Prijedor and had been mem-
bers of the town's "Crisis Committee," established in 1992 to facilitate takeover by Serb
forces. Milan Kovacevic, Director of Prijedor Hospital at the time of his arrest, and Simo
Drljaca, who was killed in the British operation, are both accused of genocide, an indict-
ment so far leveled at only five others. Some of the most notorious crimes of the war
occurred in Prijedor, where over 52,000 non-Serbs were either killed or expelled. See
Mirko Klarin, Kovacevic's Arrest and Indictment, TRIBUNAL UPDATE 36: LAsT WEEK IN THE
HAGUE (JULY 7-12, 1997), (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Brussels, Belgium),
July 16, 1997, at 1-3. For coverage of Prijedor's key figures, see also Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, The Unindicted Reaping the Rewards of "Ethnic Cleansing," 9 HUM. RTS. WATCH/
HmsINKI 17-22 (1997), and the extensive documentation in the Report of the U.N. Com-
mission of Experts.
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considering that SFOR has also committed troops to protecting Biljana
Plavsic, the President of Republika Srpska who broke with Karadzic loyal-
ists and has been openly supported by the international community ever
since. In turn, the timing and manner of SFOR's challenge to hard-line
Serb media suggests a greater interest in shutting down broadcasts that
might incite violence against NATO and other international personnel,
than in contributing to a comprehensive policy to support independent
media in Bosnia as a whole. Most critically, the apprehension of indicted
war criminals, while a critical objective, must be nested within a broader
set of policies to address civilian security, particularly in the context of
return, and to put the peace process in Bosnia on a firmer political and
social foundation. Weakening the hold of extremists is closely linked to
protecting civilians and strengthening the peace process. Standing alone,
however, it will not redress the institutionalized problems of security forces
who answer only to hardline and deeply entrenched political authorities,
none of whom yet have shown a serious commitment to a common and
democratic peace.
B. Holding National Elections
According to the Dayton Agreement, national elections were to be held no
later than nine months after the treaty's entry into force, which they were,
in mid-September 1996. Furious debate attended the lead-up to the elec-
tions, concerning the wisdom of holding them on schedule, the readiness
of the international community (specifically, the OSCE) to preside over
them, and the longevity of a multinational military commitment to Bosnia
in their aftermath.8 4 There were two primary arguments in favor of hold-
ing elections that September. First, most European and American diplo-
mats expressed the view that elections were the essential first step in
getting Bosnia's new joint institutions off the ground, which themselves
were crucial to knitting the country's fractured communities back together.
This view was strengthened by a tendency among American policymakers
to equate democracy with elections and neglect a wider array of precondi-
tions necessary for democratic success. Second, and arguably decisive,
was the stark pressure to hold elections before IFOR's mandate came to an
end. The year 1996 was also a presidential election year in the United
States, and the Clinton Administration had promised that American troops
would be out of Bosnia by December. Along these lines, supporters argued
that the Dayton timetable had to be strictly observed in order to keep pres-
sure on the Parties to meet their obligations.
The arguments against holding elections pointed to the social and
political conditions on the ground and the manifest under-preparation of
the OSCE. Critics predicted, accurately as it turned out, that the national
elections would restore to power the war-time leaders least likely to commit
84. Representative of this debate are: Misha Glenny, Decision Time in Bosnia, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 8, 1996, at D2; Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Sticking to the Dayton Accords, WASH.
PosT, June 14, 1996, at A25; Morton I. Abramowitz, Bosnia: The Farce of Premature
Elections, WASH. PosT, May 24, 1996, at A27.
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themselves to building peace, only this time with democratic legitimacy.85
The ex post facto debate, has tended to focus on whether the elections had
been technically free and fair: how many registrations were botched, what
number of ballots might have been miscounted, and so on. While not
insignificant, such technical issues were marginal to the more central con-
cern about the conditions in which the elections were held. The greater
problem was the prevailing climate of fear and uncertainty. Especially in
the absence of any confidence that NATO or the United States would stay a
course longer than December 1996, the elections could be counted upon to
produce a victory for nationalist parties.
Technical problems did exist, though their magnitude remains a sub-
ject of controversy. The independent International Crisis Group, which
has been one of the tougher critics of the 1996 elections, identified the
following problems: a higher number of voters than was technically possi-
ble, poor handling of refugee registration and out-of-country voting,8 6 a
short-fall of between 5% and 15% of registered votes from official lists, the
decision to locate several polling stations at sites of major war-time vio-
lence, technical decisions made without full disclosure to candidates and
voters, ballots that were not in the custody of accountable parties when
moved from polling stations to counting centers, and the mystifying OSCE
decision to destroy all ballots one week after votes were certified based on a
regulation adopted the day before elections were held.8 7 Of singular
destructive impact was a technical judgment made by the OSCE and the
Provisional Electoral Commission which allowed voters to register where
they intended to live, as opposed to where they currently resided or where
they had lived before the war. While undoubtedly motivated by sensitivity
to the circumstances of the uprooted, the impact of this now notorious "P-
2" form was to create a legitimate mechanism, and an open invitation, for
parties to manipulate further the ethnic balance of power within
communities.
More fundamental problems existed at the time of the elections, how-
ever: indicted war criminals still dominated political life,88 opposition pol-
85. See Glenny, supra note 84, at D2. Glenny writes:
Editorial writers have joined forces with such influential commentators as the
financier and philanthropist George Soros and former Prime Minister Haris
Silajdzic of Bosnia. All say roughly the same thing: that holding the elections
will guarantee that Humpty remains dismembered and that the results of ethnic
cleansing will be sanctioned by what is a bogus democratic gesture.
Id.
86. This is not terribly surprising since registration for over 800,000 refugees living
in dozens of host countries began just three months before the elections.
87. See generally Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICG BosNUm REP. No. 16 (Int'l
Crisis Group, London, U.K.), Sept. 22, 1996 (documenting these and other flaws in the
elections).
88. U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke brokered a deal on July 18, 1996, in
which Radovan Karadzic agreed to step down as President of the Republika Srpska and
refrain from public political activities. He nonetheless remained an active figure behind
the scenes, as he does in a more beleaguered form today.
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itician figures had been targets of attack,8 9 freedom of media and
movement were minimal, civilians from minority communities were subject
to systematic violence and intimidation from authorities, and brute uncer-
tainty prevailed among Bosnia's residents and its refugees about whether
their country could be rebuilt as one or would be split into three. In short,
Bosnia's climate was one of such manifest insecurity that the rational vote
for people to cast was for the nationalist parties, which most reliably, if
narrowly, had always promised to protect their interests.
C. Human Rights, Freedom of Movement, and Return
Questions of human rights and freedom of movement, which centrally
affect the possibility of return, have commanded a much lower priority
than they should have in the first eighteen months of Dayton implementa-
tion. Such issues are inherently difficult to address. Their lesser priority is
also attributable in no small measure to NATO's unwillingness to treat a
broader array of security issues, to the extraordinary pressure to hold
national elections, and to a hoary disinclination among international
actors to intrude upon the intimate relations between political authorities
and their citizens. This disinclination is unfortunate, particularly in the
context of third-party peace implementation, which already intrudes upon
domestic jurisdiction in multiple ways. In the context of Bosnia, according
a lesser priority to human and civil rights represents a persistently missed
opportunity by the international community to reinforce its commitment
to a unitary Bosnian state and to strengthen popular constituencies for
peace.
Further impediments to the resumption of normal living conditions
must be added to the pattern of overt violence previously described. 90
Bosnians have faced enormous obstacles to their freedom of movement
across Entity or intra-Federation lines since the Dayton Agreement was
signed. Literal impediments are posed, in the form of roadside check-
points. Despite initial progress in early 1996 when illegal checkpoints
were banned and the Parties generally complied, roadside checks began to
proliferate again over the course of the year, occasioning a second crack-
down by IPTF and SFOR in the spring of 1997.91 Bureaucratic obstacles
are also common. Taxes and "visa" fees have been routinely imposed on
people trying to move around what is intended to be one country. War-
time property laws actively discourage return and any mobility dependent
89. The most widely reported incident was the physical attack on Haris Silajdzic,
Bosnia's war-time Foreign Minister (then Prime Minister). As candidate for a multi-
national party, he was attacked on June 15, 1996, by a gang carrying SDA flags in
Cazin. See Jovan Kovacic, Assault on Bosnian Leader Highlights Tension, REUTERs WORLD
SERVICE, June 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
90. See supra Part IV, Section A.
91. "Vehicles bearing the license plates of the other entity, or the other party in the
Federation, are regularly stopped and harassed by the local police, thereby preventing
the population from exercising its right to move freely around the country." Report of
the Secretary-General on the UNMIBH, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 91 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/1997/
468 (1997).
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on fair compensation for property. Access is often denied to personal and
official records, to reconstruction and business loans, and to basic serv-
ices, like education and medical care. As in the former Yugoslavia, jobs,
pensions, social services, housing and education remain largely a state pre-
rogative; and administrative authorities enjoy a still unchecked capacity to
deny a range of civil and economic rights to minority populations or oppo-
sition figures.
Equally daunting, each national community in Bosnia has effectively
created its own symbolic exclusion zone with very practical consequences
for freedom of movement and normal living conditions. For close to two
years after the war ended, Bosnia has operated with three sets of license
plates;9 2 three international telephone exchanges; 9 3 three currencies;
94
two alphabets;95 increasingly, three languages; 96 and especially disturbing,
three school systems.9 7
The persistence of such conditions has directly militated against Day-
ton's specific guarantees that Bosnia's residents could return voluntarily to
their pre-war homes, that they could have their basic human rights pro-
tected, and that they could have confidence in a future increasingly respect-
ful of democratic participation and the rule of law. The figures on the
return of displaced persons tell the statistical tale. In 1996, roughly
252,000 refugees and internally displaced persons returned to Bosnia.98
During the same period, approximately 90,000 left.9 9 Of the former, most
returned to areas where they belonged to the national majority; most of the
latter were leaving areas where they belonged to the minority.10 0 Since the
beginning of 1997, over 80,000 have returned to Bosnia from European
92. Still, license plates display the red-checkered Croatian shield in Croat areas, the
blue-and-goldfleur-de-lis in Bosniac areas, and Cyrillic letters and the orthodox cross in
Serb territory.
93. Until late September 1997, one could not call across Entity lines. Even from
outside the country, one had to dial Republika Srpska via Serbia and Croat parts of the
Federation via Croatia.
94. The Croatian kuna, the Yugoslav dinar, and the Bosnian dinar, although
deutsche marks were welcome most everywhere.
95. Latin and Cyrillic.
96. Serbo-Croatian always had a Serbian and a Croatian variant and two alphabets.
Croatia's early reassertion of national enthusiasm-pre-independence-involved resur-
recting old Croatian vocabulary to distinguish its language from its more Balkan cousin.
Serbs have similarly reinforced historical differences that distinguish the variants. Bos-
niacs, in turn, who could hardly be expected to speak "Serbian" or "Croatian," have
begun to incorporate Turkic and Arabic vocabulary.
97. Interview with Svjetlana Derajic, International Council of Voluntary Agencies, in
Sarajevo (Nov. 1996); interview with Peggy L. Hicks, Human Rights Officer, Office of the
High Representative, in Sarajevo (Nov. 1996); interview with Ms. Julia Demichelis, in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1997). See also Lee Hockstader, In Bosnia, Classes Open on
School Segregation, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1997, at A20.
98. Of this total, 88,039 persons were refugees, see UNCHR REP oRT, supra note 69,
Annex I, and 164,217 persons were internally displaced, see id. at 11, tbl. 6.
99. See Office of the High Representative, BULL. No. 36 (Feb. 11, 1997) <http://
vww.ohr.int/bulletins/b970211.hm>.
100. Among internally displaced persons, for example, 94% returned to majority
areas. See UNHCR REPORT, supra note 69, at 11, tbl. 6.
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host countries, though most "to so-called majority areas . . . because of
continued political, security and administrative obstacles."10 Pressure
from host governments to send Bosnian refugees back coupled with the
inadequacy of local conditions, have placed UNHCR and other humanita-
rian groups working on return in a difficult position such that they can
only responsibly facilitate returns to majority areas.1 02
Recently, international implementers began focusing serious attention
on these issues, which most directly affect the prospects for normal life
among Bosnia's citizens. When the Peace Implementation Council met in
Sintra, Portugal in May 1997, it reiterated the international commitment to
a united, multi-ethnic Bosnia, and took an especially tough stance on
issues of practical concern to Bosnia's current and would-be residents:
moving toward a uniform system of car registration, integrating the coun-
try's telephone systems, opening regional airports, and amending property
laws that "place insurmountable legal barriers in the path of return."' 0 3
Sintra also called for international aid to be made conditional upon the
willingness of local authorities to accept minority return. One of Sintra's
more dramatic innovations was to give the High Representative the author-
ity to curb or suspend inflammatory media, which he has actively put into
effect in recent months against Serb broadcasts.' 0 4
Sintra represented a breakthrough, but an ironic one. Its tough lan-
guage, its assertion of a different mix of international priorities, and its
accord of new operational authority to the High Representative, was des-
perately welcome and has proved to be instrumental in pushing the Parties
to act on particular issues. There was nothing in the Sintra Declaration,
however, not one item, that could not have happened a year and a half
earlier.
101. Office of the High Representative, Report of the High Representativefor Implemen-
tation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary General of the United Nations, c1 61,
(Oct. 16, 1997) <http://www.ohr.int/reports/r971016a.htm>.
102. The numbers of Bosnians still without a durable solution are daunting: 815,000
refugees outside the country, and roughly 866,000 displaced internally within it.
Among the refugees, UNHCR estimates that over half originate from areas where they
would now be a minority, underscoring the importance "for rapid progress in minority
returns." See UNHCR REPORT, supra note 69, cl 17, 22.
103. See generally Office of the High Representative, Political Declaration from Ministe-
rial Meeting of the Steering Board of Peace Implementation Council, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess.,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1997/434 (1997). The deadline for car registration was set atJanu-
ary 1998. The deadline for telephones, set at mid-July 1997, passed without progress;
however, by September, some telephone communication across entity lines became pos-
sible for the first time since the war had ended. It is extremely limited, however,
allowing only for Sarajevo to place calls to Banja Luka, not reliably vice versa, and not
broadened beyond these major cities.
104. "The High Representative has the right to curtail or suspect any media network
or programme whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the
spirit or letter of the Peace Agreement." Id. 1 70.
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V. Lessons for the Future
In the summer of 1997, almost two years after war formally ended in Bos-
nia, a new energy surfaced among international actors helping to imple-
ment the Dayton peace accord. The United States in particular-which has
played a definitive role in Balkan events-appeared to be reinvigorating its
own engagement in Bosnia, perhaps recognizing that some turn around of
conditions would be necessary either to guarantee the exit of American
troops by June 1998 or to find a persuasive rationale for keeping them
there. For this energy to have maximum effect upon the peace process in
Bosnia, the international community will have to learn from the previous
twenty-four months of peace implementation and newly focus its efforts on
strengthening the popular stratum of Bosnian society where peace can best
be built.
First, the integration of international efforts that made Dayton possi-
ble was lost during the process of implementation. Political resources were
squandered during the first eighteen months after Dayton by divergent
strategies among agencies and involved governments. Through the end of
1996, senior officials at most major implementing agencies described a
chaotic blend of different mandates, incompatible timetables, and divided
leadership among their respective executive bodies. 10 5 Doubts about the
effectiveness of the High Representative's office, for example, discouraged
investment of material and diplomatic resources in that agency, which
proved the doubts accurate but for the wrong reason. From the very begin-
ning, the Office could have attained the capacity it has only recently
acquired. Competing agendas of international actors also created a field
day for the Bosnian parties who had skillfully manipulated such divisions
during the war. The predictable obstruction from local parties and the
clear need for ongoing negotiation made it crucial from the outset that
international efforts be internally unified and organizationally coherent.
One lesson emerging from the Bosnian experience is that the Dayton
model of decentralized peace implementation is singularly counter-produc-
tive after a negotiated and significantly open-ended settlement.
Second, not integrating military and civilian implementation created a
particularly destructive vacuum. 10 6 Just as it took a serious partnership
between military force and diplomacy to bring the Bosnian war to an end,
the success of the civilian components of peace implementation depends
upon their having integrally available the military capital of SFOR, or any
successor mission. To date, the impact of IFOR and SFOR's inattention to
the extra-military components of their mandate has been corrosive.
105. Interviews with representatives of UNHCR, U.N. Civil Affairs, IPTF, Office of the
High Representative, and OSCE in Zagreb, Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, and Brcko
(Nov. 1996).
106. The counter-example is the U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavo-
nia (UNTAES), which fully integrated its military and civilian" components under a sin-
gle command and which used this leverage repeatedly to positive effect. Interview with
Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, former Transitional Administrator, in Vukovar, Croatia (Nov. 25,
1997).
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Allowing a period of almost two years to pass during which civilians are
regularly and predictably targeted, and throughout which they have dimin-
ishing expectations that basic security of their persons and property can
be assured, has strengthened the hands of nationalist authorities and
dampened faith that a non-nationalist Bosnia might be possible.
Importantly, this period of what was widely perceived as IFOR and
SFOR's relative inaction also deprived civilian negotiators of the leverage
that could come from having NATO resources support their efforts. Nego-
tiation does not end with a settlement, after all, particularly when the Par-
ties can be expected to try end-runs around it.
Third and most critically, there lingers the question of partition. Even
if international efforts had been coordinated on the ground and civilian
activities bolstered with appropriate military resources, a profound ambiva-
lence exists among international actors about the shape of post-war Bosnia.
The Dayton Agreement leaves this question open, effecting a compromise
between unity and division that is unwieldy at best. Dynamics on the
ground pull in alternate directions, and over all hangs an aura of deep
uncertainty about which way the country will go.
It is not always easy to make the case against partition, as some of the
best evidence that many Bosnians do not want it exists at the community
level, where resources are scarce and media and inter-governmental atten-
tion low. It is also tempting to embrace the argument for partition, which
could help justify the inadequacy of the first two years of multi-billion dol-
lar international implementation. The argument for partition further
offers a convenient logic for the exit of SFOR in June 1998, which some
American commentators so aggressively demand. Whatever one's initial
instincts, the debate needs to be had and to be had well, with empirical
accuracy and a sober assessment of the impact of international efforts to
date.
Many international observers are inclined to argue that the decision is
best left to Bosnians. A fine position, but one which begs the question,
"which Bosnians?" Hard-line leaders are happy to decide themselves, since
they still control most instruments for steering the population, and there-
fore the outcome, their way. More moderate leaders and representatives of
many citizens' groups also welcome the opportunity to decide but need a
good deal of international support in order to do so. American Senator
Kay Bailey Hutchison rightly rejects a political solution for Bosnia that is
imposed from outside;10 7 but equally, one should reject a political solution
that is imposed by authoritarian politics from the inside. The objective of
international efforts should be to establish and stabilize those conditions
in which Bosnians can securely and democratically choose. Importantly,
the sheer fact of uncertainty strengthens the position of Bosnia's partition-
ists. Under current conditions, who would expect that Bosnia's citizens,
107. "The United States is trying to re-create Bosnia in the American multi-ethnic,
multicultural image-an Americanization of the Balkans, if you will." Hutchison, supra
note 2, at A31.
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who have every reason to doubt the international community's commit-
ment, would not fulfill the prophecy that the only way for them to live is to
live apart?
For many, living side-by-side would take time, and some may never
seek it. Yet, others clearly do, if only because living multi-nationally will
allow them to return to the areas from which they were driven during the
war. In 1996, three-quarters of the refugees returning did so spontane-
ously.' 0 8 In the recently-held municipal elections, parties representing dis-
placed persons won a majority of council seats in six municipalities (five in
the Federation, one in the Republika Srpska).10 9 In eighty-nine municipal-
ities, displaced voters cast ballots in their pre-war municipalities and
elected representatives to those councils: forty-two municipalities now
have between 20% and 49% of their seats occupied by representatives of
the displaced, and forty-seven municipalities have up to 20% of their seats
so occupied." 0 Whether these results can be implemented will depend
heavily on the seriousness of international commitment to seeing them
realized."'
Significantly, few of the international voices calling for partition have
ever spent significant time in Bosnia or among Bosnians, whereas many of
those arguing against partition have. Among international opponents to
partition, the most persuasive are those who have contact with Bosnia at
the community level. They do not describe a population ideologically com-
mitted to multi-ethnicity, but they do see a serious and widespread interest
in resuming normal, safe and productive lives where questions of national-
ity are marginal" n 2
The Dayton settlement was reached in large part because the balance
of forces on the ground changed. Building peace in Bosnia also demands
that the balance on the ground shifts, but instead of rearranging the hold-
108. See UNHCR REPORT, supra note 69, Annex 1.
109. The Republika Srpska municipality is Srebrenica, where they won 52% of the
seats.
110. See International Crisis Group, ICG Analysis of 1997 Municipal Election Results
(14 October 1997) <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/report/bhxxprlo.htm>. The total
number of municipalities electing councils was 135, with a total of 4,789 seats. Total
voter turnout was estimated at 87%. Id.
111. Another indicator of such sentiment even before the municipal elections has
been the success of the "Coalition for Return," the network of Bosnian and international
organizations representing returnees and the right to return independent of nationality.
The Coalition was formed in 1996 at the initiative of then Deputy High Representative
Michael Steiner, who believed that displaced persons and refugees had common inter-
ests that could unite them as a political movement. Information about the coalition can
be found at the website of the Office of the High Representative <http://www.ohr.int>.
112. Interviews with U.N. volunteers, U.N. Civil Affairs Officers, and staff of interna-
tional and local nongovermental organizations in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Pale, and Tuzla
(Nov. 1996).
Few analysts have written systematically about community-level peacebuilding in Bos-
nia, although anecdotes are abundant. A recent exception is work by Julia Demichelis
and lain Guest for the United States Institute of Peace. See lain Guest, Moving Beyond
Ethnic Conflict: Community Peace Building in Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia (Croatia)
(paper presented at the USAID Conference Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, and
Reintegration in Post-Conflict Societies, Oct. 30-31, 1997, Washington, D.C.).
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ings of Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs, it requires a transfer of power from
existing political and administrative authorities to more democratic institu-
tions and constituencies. Although typical of the work of diplomats and
large organizations, one of the more disheartening aspects of international
activity in Bosnia has been its disproportionate focus on Bosnia's ruling
Elites. While working with political leaderships is essential to implement-
ing a peace agreement to which they are signatories, and while it is Elites
who enjoy the greater capacity to obstruct that process, the international
community has chronically missed opportunities to engage directly with
those segments of Bosnia's population that could provide the most power-
ful opposition to the nationalism which tore the country apart. Today,
amid renewed debate over the purpose of international engagement in Bos-
nia, the challenge is not just to sustain the current level of involvement but
to redirect it, and to channel international resources strategically to those
constituencies in Bosnia most committed to a common peace.
